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Abstract 
This article investigates the impact of niche party success on the policy agendas of 
mainstream parties. Following from the expected electoral effects of issue politicization, 
the success of radical right and green parties will cause different reactions from mainstream 
parties. While mainstream parties emphasize anti-immigrant positions in response to radical 
right success, green party success will have the opposite effect for environmental issues. 
Since green parties constitute issue owners, their success will make established parties 
deemphasize the environment. Analyzing time-series cross-section data for 16 Western 
European countries from 1980-2011, this paper empirically establishes that green and 
radical right parties differ in their effect on mainstream party behavior and that their impact 
depends on the ideological position and past electoral performance of the mainstream 
parties. 
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Introduction 
The emergence and electoral success of radical right and green parties in several Western 
Democracies has motivated a considerable amount of political science research. It has been 
argued that these so called “niche parties” have a distinct and novel impact on patterns of 
political competition since in contrast to other parties, they rarely adapt to shifts in public 
opinion,1 and emphasize issues that depart from the traditional socio-economic cleavage.2 
Green parties as well as radical right parties mostly compete on one single issue, with the 
environment being related to green and immigration related to radical right parties. While a 
bigger part of scholarly attention has been dedicated to the ex-ante supply and demand side 
conditions for radical right and green party success,3 a growing body of research deals with 
the question of how the emergence of niche parties restructures multi-party competition and 
the behavior of established parties. Empirical research does, indeed, indicate that 
established parties react to other parties’ policy positioning4  as much as to the electoral 
success of niche parties.5 In this sense, niche parties are increasingly regarded as “issue 
entrepreneurs” because they contribute to the evolution and politicization of new political 
issues.6 Especially in the context of European integration, scholars have argued that 
successful radical right (and left) parties determine the politicization of this issue, and shape 
its importance for national political competition.7 This perspective, however, does not 
consider the important role that mainstream parties play in determining whether issues can 
1 Adams et al. 2006 
2 Wagner 2012a 
3 See for example Arzheimer 2009; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Meguid 2005; Spoon 2011 
4 Adams 2012; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009 
5 Bale et al. 2010; van Spanje 2010 
6 de Vries and Hobolt 2012; Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries 2014 
7 Hooghe and Marks 2009 
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be established on the political agenda.8 There is still no encompassing approach explaining 
established parties’ strategies when confronted with niche party success; nor has this topic 
been the subject of a broad empirical analysis.  
This paper aims at filling this gap by providing a framework that predicts established 
parties’ responses to niche party success by building on insights from theories of spatial 
and issue competition. The main argument is twofold: First, not all niche parties affect 
established parties in the same way. On the contrary, following from the different expected 
effects that politicization has on partisan realignment,9 one should observe that radical right 
party success leads to an increase of anti-immigrant positions of established parties, 
whereas green-party success will decrease the emphasis on environmental issues. While 
niche party success always creates some pressure for mainstream parties to pick up their 
promoted issue, politicization of an issue also entails the risk of strengthening the niche 
party as a result of the increased salience of this issue. This risk will be considerably higher 
for green than for radical right parties because the environment can be seen as an issue with 
a high valence component and green parties as issue owners. On the other hand, 
politicization of the immigration issue constitutes an opportunity to mobilize left-
authoritarian voters – a strategy which should be especially appealing to moderate right-
wing parties. Second, the incentives to respond to niche party success are not homogenous 
across mainstream parties. The ideological position of mainstream parties determines their 
coalitional prospects with successful niche parties; and their past electoral performance 
8 See also Green-Pedersen 2012 
9 This study follows Carmines and Wagner (2006) in conceptualizing partisan realignment as an incremental 
change linked to issue evolution rather than a radical change dependent on crucial elections.  
3 
 
                                                 
affects how willing they are to adopt new policy profiles. These two factors will, thus, 
influence how susceptible established parties are to niche party success.  
Empirically, making use of the data of the Comparative Manifestos Project, this study 
investigates the impact of niche party success in a broad time-series cross-section analysis 
for 16 Western European countries from 1980-2011. It can be shown that green and radical 
right parties do, indeed, have a different effect and that this effect is dependent on 
established parties’ characteristics. The empirical analysis also presents results that speak in 
favor of a causal relationship and reduce the possibility of reverse causality and omitted 
variable bias, both of which have rarely been discussed in other quantitative assessments of 
similar questions. The findings underline the important role that niche parties play in 
shaping multi-party competition, however, demonstrating that this role is more nuanced 
than currently assumed. The developed framework combines perspectives of spatial and 
issue competition in order to predict the strategic behavior of parties in reaction to the 
politicization of different issue types. It is, thus, not limited to radical right and green 
parties but can be applied to other parties and issues. Moreover, it presents a first step in 
conceptualizing the role of the interplay of mainstream and niche parties for the 
politicization and evolution of new issues. It thereby contributes to a bigger literature on 
party competition, representation and mass-party linkages.  
Before explaining the empirical design and elaborating the argument in more detail, the 
next section will give a brief overview of theories of spatial and issue competition and their 
relevance for the relationship between niche party success and mainstream party behavior. 
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The Role of Niche Parties in Theories of Spatial and Issue Competition 
The evolution of party positions as a result of political competition has been explained 
following two different traditions of political science research: spatial and issue 
competition. Based on Anthony Downs’ (1957) seminal work, political competition can be 
understood as parties competing through offering different positions on a policy dimension. 
The vote share of a party in this spatial conception of political competition is then 
determined by the distribution of the electorate on this issue dimension as people will vote 
for the party ideologically closest to them.10 While in a two-party plurality context this 
should lead to a convergence to the median voter, several scholars have shown how 
changing conditions such as different party systems, non-policy factors and valence 
advantages can lead to a mix of centripetal and centrifugal tendencies.11 Theories focusing 
on the supply side of political competition view the degree of convergence to the center and 
the “open space” that in turn emerges on the fringes as a main source of the varying success 
of niche and especially radical right parties.12 Following this spatial logic of party 
competition if radical right parties emerge and gain electoral support, particularly 
conservative and moderate right-wing parties should be under pressure to move their 
position to the right, in order to prevent them from further success and permanently stealing 
votes from them. The same holds for left-of-center and green parties.13 Empirical studies 
10 Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1982 
11 Adams, Merrill and Grofman 2005; Cox 1990; Wagner 2012b 
12 Kitschelt and McGann 1995 
13 Rohrschneider 1993 
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investigating this “contagious” effect of niche parties do indeed find an association between 
niche party strength and repositioning of established parties.14  
Parties do not compete solely by offering different policy positions but also by emphasizing 
different issues - preferably issues they “own,” that is issues for which traditionally a 
majority of the electorate regards them as competent and expects high problem solving 
capacity of them.15 This idea of issue competition can be understood as different parties 
trying to draw attention to different topics such as conservative parties trying to emphasize 
issues related to law and order or defense, while left-wing parties prefer issues such as 
social justice, welfare and education. However, it can be shown empirically that parties 
emphasize not only issues they own, but that they overlap considerably in their issue 
profiles.16 One reason for this overlap is that parties cannot freely determine which issues 
they prefer to emphasize, but that they have an incentive to react to issues on the party 
system agenda.17 In this sense, by putting a new issue on the agenda and increasing its 
salience, niche parties can act as issue entrepreneurs and put established parties under 
pressure to adapt their behavior accordingly.18   
Hence, following these theories of spatial and issue competition, the success of green and 
radical right parties should cause mainstream parties to emphasize the environment and 
immigration more strongly and shift their position towards the niche party. Indeed, in a 
recent publication, Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries (2014) argue that parties should emphasize 
14 Alonso and da Fonseca 2011; Dalton 2009; van Spanje 2010 
15 Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996 
16 Green-Pedersen 2007 
17 Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010 
18 de Vries and Hobolt 2012; Meguid 2008 
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environmental issues more in response to the electoral threat posed by successful green 
parties. This perspective, however, does not take into account the strategic risk that is 
involved in reacting to the issues promoted by niche parties. If established parties pick up 
these issues this will lead to the politicization of an issue, i.e. its consolidation on the 
political agenda.19 Politicization will determine which issues are on top of campaign 
agendas and, thus, affect how important positional distances are for individual vote 
decisions. This, in turn, may cause dynamics of partisan realignment, which established 
parties will take into account, when deciding on how to react to niche party success. On the 
one hand, politicization of a new issue might further strengthen the niche party and thereby 
cause voter movements away from established parties. On the other hand, it can also 
constitute an opportunity, as it may cause voter shifts from one established party to another, 
so that some established parties will have an interest in the politicization of an issue.   
Politicization, conceptualized in this way, combines perspectives of spatial and issue 
competition, since it results not only from a direct saliency-increase but can also be the 
consequence of positional shifts. Taking or changing a position on an issue promoted by a 
niche party necessarily means an increase in salience because parties need to promote this 
position, which will in turn establish it on the party system agenda. Bonnie Meguid 
similarly argues that accommodative and adversarial strategies (i.e. shifting the position 
towards or away from the niche party) will make a party more visible in respect to the 
promoted issue.20 While the direct saliency-increase through this position taking might be 
relatively marginal, it is nonetheless difficult to predict the extent of saliency increase 
19 Green-Pedersen 2010, Green-Pedersen 2012 
20 Meguid 2008, 94 
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since, in particular, the mass media can work as an additional agenda setter in response to 
political developments.21 Hence, taking a position on a new issue is always linked to the 
risk of increasing the salience of an issue. Moving towards the position of a niche party, 
will, thus, be a very costly strategy if the expected voter shifts following politicization go 
away from the established party. On the other hand, if established parties expect to benefit 
from the politicization of an issue, they have a big incentive to pick up the issue and move 
their position.     
Building on this argument about the strategic considerations of politicization, the next 
section will elaborate how reactions of established parties to niche party success depend on 
the type of niche party as well as mainstream party characteristics.  
 
The Impact of Niche Party Success on Mainstream Party Behavior 
While most research on niche parties has treated radical right and green parties as 
substantially the same, or has focused on one of the two types, it is the goal of this section 
to provide a framework which can account for varying strategies of established parties, 
depending on the risks and opportunities of partisan realignment associated with 
politicization of the niche party issue. These risks and opportunities will be different for 
radical right and green parties because they compete on different types of issues and vary in 
their degree of issue ownership. Moreover, these strategic incentives will not be 
21 Walgrave and van Aelst 2006 
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homogenous across mainstream parties, but will also vary with their ideological position 
and electoral performance.  
Following Stokes’ (1963) seminal critique of Downs’ spatial theory of voting, it is possible 
to distinguish positional and valence issues. Position-issues are characterized by a set of 
alternatives on which voters have different preferences, while valence issues are issues that 
are generally seen as positive or negative with parties competing over competence.22 These 
types of issues lead to different dynamics of political competition. Whereas parties’ 
position taking will mainly determine competition over positional issues, issue ownership 
and salience constitute the key components of competition over a valence issue. With green 
parties above all campaigning on the issue of the environment and radical right parties 
focusing on immigration, they represent these two different issue types. This distinction is 
of course ideal-typical, and one might doubt that issues are either completely valence or 
completely positional. However, the environment surely constitutes an issue with a high 
valence component. While there might be an argument about how important it is, only few 
voters would not perceive a pollution-free environment as an actual goal. On the other 
hand, there is far less agreement about immigration in the electorate, with positions already 
varying strongly on the question of how much immigration there should be and which 
immigrants should be allowed to enter a country. A first distinction between radical right 
and green parties lies, thus, in the first competing on a polarized and more positional issue, 
while the latter compete on an issue with a high valence component. This distinction affects 
the strategic choices available to established parties. In response to radical right party 
22 Stokes 1963 
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success, established parties are far more likely to make positional changes on the 
immigration issue, whereas reactions to green party success will be more limited to the 
saliency dimension of environmental issues. Moreover, these different issue types are also 
linked to different degrees of issue ownership, which, in turn, determines the risk of losing 
own supporters to a niche party in case of politicization of an issue.  
As discussed earlier, the concept of issue ownership can be understood as different parties 
being perceived as being better able to handle specific problems and, thus, benefitting from 
their salience. More precisely one should distinguish a competence and an associative 
dimension of issue ownership.23 Competence represents a party’s perceived problem 
solving capacity, whereas the associative dimension includes the feeling of intuitively 
linking a party to an issue. Using data from the third wave of the Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems (2012) in Austria, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Sweden, Figure 1 shows that green parties’ issue ownership (on the competence dimension) 
of the environment issue is much higher than radical right parties’ issue ownership of 
immigration.  
Figure 1 – Issue ownership of green and radical right parties 
23 Walgrave, Lefevere and Tresch 2012 
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While 42 per cent of those who perceive environment as the most or second most important 
problem name a green party as the most competent to deal with this issue, only 16 per cent 
do so for immigration and radical right parties.24 This difference is statistically highly 
significant. While there is no broad comparative assessment yet, Walgrave et al. find that in 
Belgium the associative issue ownership of green parties is much higher than that of radical 
right parties.25  
24 The exact wording of the question is: “What do you think is the (second) most important political problem 
facing [COUNTRY] today?” About 6 per cent of the respondents name the environment as the first or second 
most important problem; about 14 per cent do so for immigration. The coding of the answers given to the 
most important problem question is very diverse among the CSES studies. The sample here is, thus, limited to 
those countries, which are part of the quantitative analysis and where some homogeneity among these 
categories could be established.  
25 Walgrave, Lefevere and Tresch 2012, 5 
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Following from the different type of issues they compete on as well as their varying degree 
of issue ownership, green parties can be expected to benefit much more from politicization 
of their issue than radical right parties. For established parties this means that the risk of 
politicization of the environment issue, thereby causing partisan realignment in favor of 
green parties, is very high. As also Riker (1996) has shown, if a party is able to dominate 
political discourse on an issue, other parties have a strategic incentive to drop this issue. 
Hence, as soon as green parties gain electoral support, other parties will have an incentive 
to not compete on environmental issues. This line of argumentation, diverges from Spoon 
et al. (2014), who, analyzing the impact of green party success from an issue 
entrepreneurial perspective, show that other parties emphasize environmental issues more, 
when green parties are successful. The methods and results sections will elaborate in more 
detail how the design applied in this study differs from Spoon et al. and how the contrasting 
findings can be explained.  
In contrast to the environment, since immigration is a strongly positional issue and radical 
right parties are not perceived as dominantly competent on this issue, politicization will not 
necessarily lead to an increase in radical right party strength. Hence, whereas the issue 
ownership of green parties provides an incentive for established parties to deemphasize 
environmental issues as a response to green parties’ electoral success, this is not the case 
for radical right parties and the immigration issue. Radical right parties should, thus, 
indeed, function as issue entrepreneurs, since the costs of not re-positioning and not 
responding to an issue on the agenda outweigh the possible risks of the politicization of the 
immigration issue.    
12 
 
For some established parties the politicization of the immigration issue should even be 
beneficial since it creates an opportunity for partisan realignment towards their party. A 
substantial share of the Western European electorate can be identified as left-
authoritarian.26 This part of the electorate, however, lacks representation on the supply side 
of politics, i.e. on the party level.27 Having to choose between representation on one of 
these two dimensions, left-authoritarian voters tend to privilege economic over second 
dimension issues such as immigration and European integration and, thus, vote for parties 
located on the left of the economic left-right dimension.28 Since, however, issue salience 
affects the degree of issue voting, politicization of immigration can shift this balance 
towards the socio-cultural dimension. Emphasizing the immigration issue and thereby 
establishing it on the political agenda can, thus, be a valuable strategy for conservative and 
other right-of-center parties to attract left-authoritarian voters. The same mechanism, 
however, does not hold for mainstream left parties and the environment. Environmental 
issues by large can be integrated into the socio-economic dimension and, thus, create far 
less political potential.29 Moreover, as outlined before, green parties dominate the discourse 
on the environment and will be the beneficiaries of partisan realignment in case of 
politicization. 
Hence, taking into account the discussed risks and opportunities resulting from issue 
politicization, established parties should react differently to radical right and green party 
26 Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi et al. 2006 
27 van der Brug and van Spanje 2009 
28 Lefkofridi, Wagner and Willmann 2013 
29 In a detailed analysis of voter and party positions Kriesi and colleagues (2008) colleagues show that 
environmental protection can be integrated into the socio-economic left-right dimension. Immigration, 
however, constitutes a main component of a second, socio-cultural dimension.  
13 
 
                                                 
success. While the success of niche parties exerts some pressure on mainstream parties to 
shift their position and put the according issues on the agenda, politicization of an issue 
always includes the risk of strengthening the according niche parties, thereby causing 
partisan realignment away from established and towards the new parties. This risk will be 
considerably higher for green than for radical right parties because the environment can be 
seen as an issue with a high valence component and green parties as issue owners of this 
issue. On the other hand, politicization of the immigration issue constitutes an opportunity 
to appeal to new voter groups especially those that can be identified as left-authoritarian.   
Four hypotheses about the impact of niche party success on the policy agendas of 
established parties follow from this theoretical framework: 
H1a: Increasing radical right party support causes mainstream parties to shift towards anti-
immigrant positions 
H1b: Increasing radical right party support causes mainstream parties to emphasize the 
immigration issue  
H2a: Increasing green party support will not affect mainstream parties’ positions on 
environmental issues 
H2b: Increasing green party support will cause mainstream parties to deemphasize 
environmental issues 
 
14 
 
While the main distinction made here is about the type of niche party, according to the 
presented framework established parties should also vary in their susceptibility to niche 
party success depending on their own ideological position and past electoral performance. 
First, politicization of niche party issues affects mainstream parties in a different way 
because they differ in their coalitional prospects with emerging niche parties. How much 
the success of a niche party affects the possibilities of getting into office depends on the 
mainstream party’s ideological position. Moderate right-wing parties will have a higher 
incentive to politicize the immigration issue in response to radical right party success since 
these parties constitute a potential partner to form a coalition.30 Moreover, as outlined 
before, using the immigration issue to potentially cause realignment of left-authoritarian 
voters that have traditionally identified with left-wing parties, will be an especially 
appealing strategy for mainstream conservative parties. Parties of the Left not only are very 
unlikely to form a coalition with a radical right party, but by politicizing the immigration 
issue might also disqualify themselves for coalitions with other left-of-center parties.31 The 
incentive to deemphasize environmental issues as a response to green party success, on the 
other hand, should be stronger for right-of-center parties. Green parties are more likely to 
form a coalition with left-wing parties and politicizing the environment issue should 
generally favor parties which are located left of the center.  
Second, since past election results constitute a source of information about voters’ 
preference distributions,32 they will influence parties’ predisposition to adopt new issues 
30 Bale 2003 
31 Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008 
32 Budge 1994 
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and change their position. Losers and winners of elections have, thus, different incentives to 
respond to niche party success. As has been demonstrated in the literature on issue 
evolution and party campaigning, parties which have lost votes at a previous election 
should be more likely to shift their position33 or contribute to the politicization of a new 
issue.34 Politicizing immigration in response to radical right party success will be especially 
appealing to those parties that have not performed well in past elections and because of that 
feel a need to change their profile and campaigning strategies. In contrast, since green 
parties are issue owners and dominate the discourse on the environment, established parties 
have an incentive to drop the issue no matter how well they performed at past elections. 
Three more hypotheses follow form these considerations: 
H3a: The more to the right a mainstream party can be located the more it will shift towards 
anti-immigrant positions and increase the salience of the immigration issue in response to 
radical right party success      
H3b: The more to the right a mainstream party can be located the more it will deemphasize 
environmental issues in response to green party success      
H4: The more votes a mainstream party has lost at a previous election the more it will shift 
towards anti-immigrant positions and increase the salience of the immigration issue in 
response to radical right party success   
33 Somer-Topcu 2009 
34 Riker 1986, Riker 1996 
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This section provided an encompassing framework to predict the different effects of niche 
party success on established parties’ policy agendas. The next section will test the derived 
hypotheses in a time-series cross-section analysis of Western European countries.  
The Impact of Niche Parties on Mainstream Party Behavior – Empirical Analysis 
The formulated hypotheses will be analyzed using data mainly from the Comparative 
Manifesto Project.35 The data set is based on the coding of quasi-sentences following 56 
issue categories which are then used to estimate how much emphasis is put on an issue in a 
manifesto. The items, thus, measure position and salience of an issue in a manifesto. The 
data set contains party manifestos in 42 countries, many of them reaching back until 1945 
and allows evaluating the effect of niche party support on mainstream party manifestos 
cross-nationally and over time. The analyses presented here are based on a subset including 
all significant mainstream parties in 16 Western European countries from 1980-2011. 36 
The remaining sample includes 521 party manifestos.37   
Operationalization 
In order to test the hypotheses derived in the last section, it is necessary to estimate the 
effect of niche party support on mainstream parties’ issue positions as well as issue 
emphasis. The measure for position is constructed in a similar way to Kim and Fording 
(2003): In order to obtain a measure of position which is independent of salience, one can 
35 Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2012 
36 Parties are coded as mainstream parties if they belong to one of the following party family categories 
provided by the Manifesto data set: social democratic, liberal, conservative or christian democratic. The 
countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.    
37 The number of observations in the statistical analysis is then further reduced due to missing values on the 
independent variables such as immigration rates.  
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make use of the paired nature of the manifesto data and subtract the summed share of a 
positive category of the summed share of a negative category. This difference is then 
divided by the sum of positive and negative categories. Salience is simply measured by the 
sum of positive and negative shares. 
Since the manifesto data does not include direct items of party positions on immigration, it 
is measured using item per607 “Multiculturalism: Positive” and item per608 
“Multiculturalism: Negative.” Statements against multicultural societies and appeals for 
cultural homogeneity represent the idea of cultural protectionism which can be regarded as 
the main ideological offer presented by radical right parties.38 A measure of the position on 
multiculturalism is then calculated according to the description given above: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀. ) = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀608 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀607
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀608 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀607 
The higher a party scores on this measure, the more it represents restrictive policies towards 
citizenship acquisition and immigration in an election. A measure of the saliency of 
multiculturalism is calculated as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 (𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀. ) = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀608 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀607 
In line with the idea that the environment constitutes a valence issue, there is no pair of 
environment categories but only one item (per501) representing pro-environment 
statements. However, in order not to simply assume the non-existence of a positional 
dimension, item per410 “Productivity” is used as an opposite of “Environmental 
38 Norris 2005, 166ff. 
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Protection: Positive”.39 An emphasis on industrial productivity and economic growth can 
be regarded as standing in opposition to a focus on a pollution free environment and more 
sustainable growth. Position and salience are calculated accordingly:  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀 (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀. ) =  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀501 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀410
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀501 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀410 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀 (𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀. ) = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀501 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀410 
The main independent variables of interest are radical right and green party support, 
measured as their vote share at the previous parliamentary election.40 Radical right parties 
were coded according to Norris (2005) and Mudde (2007) and all electoral results are taken 
from the Parliament and Government Composition Database (ParlGov).41 If there was 
more than one radical right or green party with a vote share high enough to be reported by 
the ParlGov database, the sum of their vote shares is used for this election in order to 
measure the combined amount of pressure that is put on mainstream parties. A list of all 
radical right and green parties included can be found in table A1 in the online appendix.42 
All models control for party size and if a party was in government during the election 
period before the election manifesto. The information on party size (in vote share) and 
government status are again based on data from the ParlGov database. The models 
39 Additional analyses using different operationalizations of the dependent variable can be found in the online-
appendix  
40 One exception is the result of the French Front National in the election of 2002. Due to their success in the 
presidential campaign they decided not to run in the parliamentary election and to concentrate all their efforts. 
For this election the result of the first round of the presidential election is used.  
41 Döring and Manow 2011 
42 Since the Portuguese green party ran together with the communist party from 1987 (see Spoon et al. 2013) 
one could argue that it should not be counted as a green party. The results presented include the Portuguese 
greens but are robust against excluding Portugal from the analysis. 
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investigating the impact of radical right support additionally include a control for the 
number of immigrants. Higher rates of immigration might cause radical right party success 
as well as influence mainstream party agendas since they are likely to affect general 
attitudes concerning immigration. The number of immigrants is measured as the log of the 
average of incoming migrants in the previous election period. Models on green party 
support instead include the log of GDP per capita (as a proxy for the degree of post-
materialism of a society) and a time dummy for the period following the Chernobyl 
disaster, which increased the salience of environmental issues and created high levels of 
support for environmental movements and green parties. Summary statistics for all 
variables can be found in Table A2 in the online appendix. 
Model Specification 
Several pooled time-series cross-section models are estimated with OLS to assess the 
impact of radical right and green party support on mainstream party policy agendas. In 
order to account for serial correlation and panel-specific heteroskedasticity the models 
include a lagged dependent variable, and panel corrected standard errors are calculated.43 
The lagged dependent variable also has a substantial meaning since party manifestos are 
not always written from scratch, but are heavily based on previous manifestos. All models 
also include party-dummy fixed effects to account for unit specific heterogeneity. The 
inclusion of the fixed effects reduces the analyzed variation to the within-party variation 
over time and, thus, controls for time-constant party and country specific particularities. 
The following two basic models are estimated for issue position and salience respectively: 
43 Beck and Katz 1995, Beck and Katz 1996 
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(1) 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0�𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽1�𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� +
𝛽𝛽2�𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3�𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡      
(2) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀,𝑀𝑀 = 𝛽𝛽0�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀,𝑀𝑀−1� + 𝛽𝛽1�𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀,𝑀𝑀−1� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀,𝑀𝑀� +
𝛽𝛽3�𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀,𝑀𝑀� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀,𝑀𝑀� + 𝛽𝛽5�𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀� + 𝜐𝜐𝑀𝑀 + 𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀,𝑀𝑀 
where i is an indication for party and t for election date.  
 
This design differs in three main aspects from Spoon et al. (2014) who investigate the effect 
of green party strength on other parties’ issue emphasis on environmental protection also 
using the Manifesto data. First, in contrast to Spoon et al. (who only use per501 as their 
dependent variable) this study distinguishes between position and salience of the dependent 
variable. As will be discussed later, robustness checks using different operationalizations of 
the dependent variable (including only using per501) confirm the findings of the basic 
regression models. Second, this analysis does not include a measure of green issue salience 
among the electorate as a control variable. Such a variable is highly endogenous to the 
process under investigation here because party positions and their issue emphases of course 
determine which problems are regarded as most pressing among citizens.44 The most 
important difference in this design lies in the inclusion of party fixed effects, which is 
essential to make causal claims about the effect of niche party success on mainstream party 
44 This becomes even more problematic considering that the according item in the Eurobarometer data is only 
measured at 3 time points for the period between 1979 and 2001. Simply imputing the values for the other 
time periods seems questionable. 
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behavior.45 Limiting the analysis to the variation over time, has the essential advantage of 
controlling for time constant party and country characteristics which are likely to bias the 
findings. In particular, this concerns the possibility that the population in some countries 
might simply be more pro-environment than in others, which would explain both, the 
success of green parties and the issue emphasis/position of mainstream parties. A positive 
correlation between green party support and mainstream parties’ emphasis on 
environmental protection based on cross-sectional analyses involves, thus, the high risk of 
being spurious.   
 
Results 
Table 1 – Results basic regression models 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Multiculturalism 
Position 
Multiculturalism 
Salience 
 Environment 
Position 
Environment 
Salience 
      
Lagged DV 0.018 0.411* Lagged DV 0.043 0.187 
 
 
(0.117) (0.160)  (0.104) (0.108) 
Radical 
Right 
Support (t-1) 
 
0.032** 
(0.008) 
0.085** 
(0.032) 
Green Party 
Support  
(t-1) 
-0.030 
(0.017) 
-0.456** 
(0.165) 
Immigration 
(log) 
 
0.164** 
(0.028) 
0.282* 
(0.113) 
GDP per 
Capita (log) 
0.193 
(0.106) 
0.986 
(0.716) 
45 The F-Tests for models only including the party fixed effects indeed show that they are statistically 
significant. Figure A1 in the online appendix additionally presents the variation in their effects for the four 
basic models. 
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Party Size 
 
 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
0.023 
(0.019) 
Party Size 0.004 
(0.006) 
0.069* 
(0.034) 
Government 
Party 
-0.233** 
(0.074) 
-0.272 
(0.250) 
Government 
Party 
 
0.048 
(0.048) 
0.732* 
(0.309) 
   Chernobyl -0.046 1.863** 
    (0.084) (0.697) 
      
Party Fixed 
Effects 
  Party Fixed 
Effects 
  
      
Observations 202 365 Observations 406 429 
R-squared 0.732 0.590 R-squared 0.625 0.833 
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Main Effects. Table 1 presents the results for the basic regression-models. As can be seen, 
radical right and green parties do, indeed, differ in their impact on established parties’ 
agendas.46 Radical right party support has a significant positive effect. With growing vote 
share of a radical right party at the previous election, mainstream parties shift their profile 
towards a more ethno-cultural and restrictive position on immigration. In response to an 
increase in radical right party support, mainstream parties equally increase the salience of 
the multiculturalism issue. An increasing number of immigrants not only causes parties to 
talk more about immigration, but also to shift their position towards a more restrictive 
profile. Parties in government, on the other hand, take a more positive position on 
multiculturalism. The findings in Model 1 and 2, thus, support hypotheses 1a and 1b; 
46 The difference in the number of observations between the position and valence models is due to the 
calculation procedure. If a manifesto does not include any statements belonging to one of the categories this 
will lead to a missing value for the position variable, while it will be zero for salience.  
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radical right parties function as issue entrepreneurs and exert the contagious effect that has 
been found in other studies. Green party support, on the other hand, has no significant 
effect on mainstream party positions on environmental issues. The sign of the b-coefficient 
is even negative, indicating that facing green party success, established parties rather move 
away from a pro-environment position. With an increase in green party vote share, 
mainstream parties, however, significantly decrease the salience of environmental issues in 
their manifestos. Hence, as predicted by the presented framework and in line with 
hypotheses 2a and 2b, facing a successful issue owner, established parties do not change 
their position in direction of the niche party and deemphasize the promoted issue.  
These results have important implications for the study of niche parties, multi-party 
competition and mass-elite linkages. The finding that actual levels of immigration affect 
parties’ positions and issue salience speaks in favor of the dynamic representation model of 
political parties47 and demonstrates how globalization and de-nationalization are, indeed, 
reshaping the political space in Western Europe.48 While confirming the contagious effect 
of radical right parties, they speak against the idea that green party success is the driving 
force behind the issue evolution of environmental issues. On the contrary, in line with 
Green-Pedersen (2012) these findings emphasize the role of mainstream parties and their 
anticipation of electoral consequences when analyzing issue politicization.       
Robustness and Causality.  The functional form of the models in table 2 including levels 
(instead of differences) of the dependent and independent variable as well as a lagged 
47 Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson 1995 
48 Kriesi et al. 2008 
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dependent variable assumes an instantaneous response function with a geometrically 
decaying effect of 𝛽𝛽1 of the size of 𝛽𝛽0.49 An autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model 
(i.e. including an additional lag of the independent variable) would allow a more flexible 
adaption rate and would, thus, allow investigating a more nuanced dynamic relationship 
over time. However, since the size of t in this study is rather small (we are dealing with 
elections and not country-years), the information to estimate these additional parameters is 
limited, which makes this procedure problematic for the data at hand. In order to get an 
impression of these dynamics, however, table A3 in the online appendix presents the results 
of an ADLLDV2 (ADL with two lagged dependent variables) model which allows 
assessing the nature of the dynamic relationship due to the nested structure of these 
models.50 Three of the four additional lagged independent variables (vote share of radical 
right and green parties at t-2) are far from statistical significance implying instantaneous 
adaption rates. None of the additional lagged dependent variables reaches statistical 
significance. This supports the use of the functional form specified in equation (1) and (2). 
Only model 4 which estimates the effect of green party support on the salience of 
environmental issues shows an additional significant negative lag for green party support. 
This finding implies that established parties might deemphasize environmental issues in 
response to green parties’ electoral success with a certain time lag. Due to the rather limited 
number of elections per country, however, these findings should be interpreted cautiously 
and at best seen as indicative. The following analyses are again based on the levels 
specification presented in equation (1) and (2). 
49 Beck and Katz 2011 
50 Beck and Katz 2011, 340 
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As an additional robustness check tables A4 and A5 in the online appendix present the 
effect of radical right and green party support on different measures of the respective 
dependent variable. The measurement of the dependent variable in table A4 follows Alonso 
and da Fonseca (2011) who suggest a different operationalization of immigration using the 
Manifesto data. Here, too, we find a statistically significant positive effect of the vote share 
of radical right parties on anti-immigrant positioning and the salience of immigration 
issues. Table A5 presents the regression results for two alternative measures of 
environmental issues. First, only per501 (Environmental Protection: Positive) is used as a 
dependent variable. While this makes it impossible to fully distinguish between changes in 
position and salience, this specification allows a more straight-forward comparison with the 
effects found by Spoon et al. (2013), who use exactly this dependent variable to measure 
the salience of environmental protection. Model 2 and 3 present estimates for another 
dependent variable adding an additional item per416 (Anti-Growth Economy: Positive) to 
our earlier operationalization. A focus on anti-growth policies and sustainable development 
can be regarded as an additional positive mentioning of the environment, representing a 
contrast to the category productivity. As model 1 in table A5 shows, green party support 
has a negative effect on pro-environment statements, confirming the earlier findings. In 
response to green party success, mainstream parties, indeed, deemphasize environmental 
protection. Model 2 and 3, as well, are in line with the hypotheses showing that green party 
success does not significantly affect positions on the environment, while with an increase in 
green party vote share established parties significantly deemphasize the salience of 
environmental issues. Using different operationalizations of the dependent variables, thus, 
confirms the findings in table 1.     
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Two main problems arise in interpreting these effects as a causal impact of niche party 
success on mainstream party behavior: reverse causality and omitted variable bias. As 
Meguid (2005; 2008) has convincingly argued, the success of niche parties is highly 
dependent on mainstream party strategies. Hence, it is possible that established parties’ 
issue strategies on immigration and the environment determine niche party vote share and 
not the other way around, as has been argued here. A simple Granger reverse causality 
model51 constitutes a possibility to assess reverse causality by running regression models 
using the dependent variable at t-1 to predict the independent variable at time t.52 As 
models 1 and 3 in table A6 in the online appendix show, a party’s position on immigration 
or environment does not significantly affect the vote share of radical right or green parties 
at the subsequent election, thus, speaking against reverse causality for these models. Model 
4 does show a significant effect of environmental salience on green party support. 
However, since this effect is positive, reverse causality, here, even constitutes a bias against 
our earlier findings, which describe a negative impact of green party support on salience of 
the environment. Finally, model 2 shows a significant positive effect of a party’s 
immigration emphasis on radical right party success. This does, indeed, indicate that 
reverse causality constitutes a potential problem when interpreting the effect of radical right 
support on mainstream parties’ emphasis of the immigration issue. It is, thus, not possible 
to fully identify a causal effect for this relationship, which should rather be interpreted as 
correlational.  
51 Sargent 1976 
52 It should be mentioned that since these regressions use single party positions/emphases as their independent 
variable, they cannot serve as a direct test for Meguid’s theory, which is based on party system characteristics 
(the issue strategies of several parties). 
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A second problem for interpreting the effects as a causal impact of niche party success 
arises from possible omitted variable bias. While one might find an association between 
increasing vote share of niche parties and movements towards their emphasized issues by 
established parties, this could be caused by shifts in public attitudes. The literature on party 
competition has convincingly demonstrated that mainstream parties, indeed, react to shifts 
in public opinion.53 Hence, if public opinion determines both mainstream parties’ issue 
position/emphasis and niche party success, then one would find an association without any 
causal link between the two. Looking at the results presented here, however, this constitutes 
a problem only for the impact of radical right parties and not for green parties. It is possible 
that a shift towards an anti-immigrant public attitude causes radical right success as well as 
a higher share of manifestos dedicated to cultural protectionism. However, it is rather 
implausible that a not-observed condition should increase green party vote share and at the 
same time decrease environmental issues in party manifestos. Moreover, the inclusion of 
the lagged dependent variable partly controls for this omitted variable bias, insofar as it 
captures the effect of public opinion on party positions at t-1. The actual bias is, thus, 
reduced to the scenario where public opinion influences the vote share of a radical right 
party at t-1 and party positions at t, but has not influenced party positions at t-1. In sum, the 
findings indicate that niche party success has a causal impact on mainstream party agendas 
and that this effect differs according to the type of niche party.  
Mainstream Party Positions and Past Electoral Performance. In order to investigate the 
effects proposed in the other hypotheses, two interactions have been added to the basic 
53 Adams et al. 2004, Adams et al. 2006 
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models successively. As stated in H3a and H3b, parties more located to the right should be 
more likely to shift their position and emphasize immigration, but have a bigger incentive 
to deemphasize environmental issues as a response to the according niche party success. 
Hence, there should be an interaction between left-right placement of a party and niche 
party support. The index for the general left-right position used here is provided by the 
CMP data (rile). It theoretically ranges from -100 to 100 with higher values indicating a 
party being more on the right. It should be emphasized that the index for left-right 
positioning of a party does not include the items used as dependent variables here. The rile 
measure derived from the manifesto data has been subject to considerable criticism.54 
However, it remains the only measure of parties’ left-right position that is time-variant and 
available for the time under investigation here. As an additional robustness check table A9 
and figure A2 in the online appendix present results using a composite measure of the 
average standardized values of the rile measure and Benoit and Laver’s (2006) expert 
measure of a party’s left-right position. H4 states that electoral losers are more susceptible 
to radical right party success. In order to test this hypothesis an additional interaction with 
vote difference has been added, indicating vote gains/losses as the difference in vote share 
between t-1 and t-2. While no relationship was hypothesized for green party success, the 
results are presented in order to underline this claim. 
54 Gemenis 2013 
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Since the main effects of interest are interactions of two continuous variables the best way 
of interpreting them is a marginal effects plot,55 which can be found in Figure 2 and 3. The 
according regression tables can be found in the online appendix (table A7 and A8). 
Figure 2 – Marginal effect of niche party success conditional on left-right position             
 
Dashed lines give 95%-confidence intervals 
 
Figure 2 shows how the effect of niche party support varies with the left-right position of an 
established party. First, the positive effect of radical right support on anti-immigrant 
positions and issue emphasis increases with a party moving to the right on the left-right 
scale. This indicates that right-of-center parties are more inclined to politicize the 
55 Brambor, Clark and Golder 2005 
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immigration issue. This is in line with the expectation that radical right success due to 
coalitional perspectives presents less of a threat to these parties and that they can use this 
strategy to appeal to left-authoritarian voters. Yet, there is still a significant positive effect 
for center and moderate left-wing parties, especially pronounced for positional changes. 
This indicates that even left-of-center parties on average choose an accommodative strategy 
and emphasize anti-immigrant positions when facing an increase in radical right support. 
On the other hand, no matter where a mainstream party can be located on the left-right 
scale, there is no significant marginal effect of green party vote share on positional shifts on 
the environment issue. However, confirming hypothesis 3b, the more a party is located to 
the right, the more it deemphasizes environmental issues in response to green party success. 
Nevertheless, one can still observe a significant negative marginal effect for more left-wing 
parties. Hence, while it is more pronounced for parties of the Right, parties of all 
mainstream party families deemphasize environmental issues facing the increasing strength 
of an issue owner. These findings also speak against a purely spatial interpretation of the 
impact of niche party success on mainstream party strategies. Following a spatial logic of 
political competition, one should observe right-wing parties reacting more strongly to 
radical right party success and left-wing parties more strongly to green party success. This, 
however, is not the case for the countries and time-period observed here. First, although 
right-of-center parties react more strongly to radical right success, they also deemphasize 
the environment more in response to increasing green party support. Second, a wide range 
of parties reacts to niche party success particularly by emphasizing and deemphasizing 
issues. This speaks for the important role that issue salience plays in assessing the impact of 
niche parties on multi-party competition.  
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 Figure 3 – Marginal effect of niche party success conditional on vote difference at t-1 
 
Dashed lines give 95%-confidence intervals 
 
Finally, figure 3 confirms that parties which have lost votes at a previous election react 
more strongly to radical right party success than those who performed better. The more 
votes a party has lost at the previous election the more it shifts its position and emphasizes 
multiculturalism in response to an increase in radical right vote share. These parties indeed 
follow a logic of dispersion and engage in strategies that will lead to the politicization of an 
issue they perceive as likely to cause partisan realignment. In contrast, with green parties 
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dominating discourse on the environment, their success provides an incentive to 
deemphasize the issue independent of past electoral performance.  
In sum, the results presented here support the hypotheses derived from a new approach 
taking into account considerations of spatial and issue competition in order to predict 
mainstream parties’ responses to niche party success. These parties do act strategically and 
choose their positions and issue emphases according to the electoral consequences that can 
be expected from the politicization of an issue. However, their reactions are not 
homogenous among all parties but depend on their ideological position and past election 
results. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has quantitatively assessed the impact of niche party success on mainstream 
party policy strategies, showing how this effect varies according to the type of niche party. 
The success of radical right parties provides an incentive for established parties especially 
of the moderate right to shift their position towards a cultural protectionist profile and to 
emphasize the immigration issue in order to appeal to left-authoritarian voters. In response 
to green party success, on the other hand, parties deemphasize the environment issue 
because a successful issue owner of this topic has entered the field. These mechanisms and 
strategic considerations vary with ideological position and past electoral performance of the 
established parties. Right-wing parties and electoral losers change their immigration policy 
agendas more strongly in response to radical right success than parties that are located left 
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of the center. Moreover, mainstream parties located more to the right tend to deemphasize 
environmental issues more, when facing electoral gains of a green party.  These findings 
and insights on the strategic behavior of mainstream parties in response to niche party 
success have important implications for the analysis of multi-party competition and issue 
evolution. First, they underline the important role that both spatial and issue competition 
play in determining the behavior of political parties and their reactions to each other. 
Dynamic representation should, thus, not only be understood in terms of parties’ positions 
but equally needs to take into account parties’ issue emphases.  While theories of spatial 
and issue competition have mostly been presented as two competing theories about party 
competition, nothing in the general nature of these theories prescribes that it is impossible 
to include insights from both perspectives. Dynamics of saliency and position are crucial to 
understanding the impact that radical right and green parties have on mainstream parties – 
they are very likely to have equally intertwined effects for other types of parties and in 
other areas of multi-party competition. Second, while niche parties play an important role 
in explaining issue evolution, this study shows that niche party success does not necessarily 
lead to the politicization of their promoted issues. Mainstream parties react strategically and 
assess the possible effect that politicization of a certain issue will have on their future 
electoral performance. Further research will be needed to explore if these findings also hold 
for other types of niche parties and the issues they compete on. Moreover, analyses of 
electoral behavior will help to investigate the micro-level mechanisms that have been 
assumed in this study of party behavior.       
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Online Supplementary Appendix to “Niche Party Success and Mainstream Party Policy 
Shifts – How Green and Radical Right Parties Differ in Their Impact”  
Table A1 – Radical Right and Green Parties 
Country 
 
Radical Right Party Green Party 
 
Austria 
 
Alliance for the Future of Austria 
 
The Greens (Die Grünen) 
 Freedom Party (after 1986)  
Belgium Front National Agalev – Groen 
 Vlaams Blok/Belang Ecolo 
Denmark Danish People’s Party Greens (De Gronne) 
 Progress Party  
Finland True Finns Green League 
France Front National Greens (Les Verts) 
Germany Deutsche Volksunion Greens (Bündins 90 – Die Grünen) 
 Die Republikaner  
 Nationaldemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands 
 
Great Britain Green Party 
Ireland  Green Party 
Italy Alleanza Nazionale 
Lega Nord 
Movimento Sociale–Fiamma 
Tricolore 
Green Federation (Federazione dei 
Verdi) 
Luxembourg The Greens (Déi Gréng) 
Netherlands Center Democrats Greens (De Groenen) 
 List Pim Fortuyn GreenLeft (GroenLinks) 
 Party for Freedom  
Norway Progress Party  
Portugal  Greens (Os Verdes) 
Spain  Initiative for Catalonia Greens 
(Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds) 
Sweden New Democracy Greens (Miljöpartiet) 
 Sweden Democrats  
Switzerland Freiheits-Partei der Schweiz Greens (Grüne – Écologiste) 
 Nationale Aktion für Volk und 
Heimat 
 
 Schweizer Demokraten  
 Schweizerische Volkspartei  
1 
 
Table A2– Summary Statistics  
 Mean Sd Min Max N 
 
Multiculturalism 
Position 
-0.46 0.72 -1.00 1.00 313 
Multiculturalism 
Salience 
1.12 2.21 0.00 16.99 525 
Environment 
Position 
0.38 0.58 -1.00 1.00 503 
Environment 
Salience 
7.14 4.63 0.00 29.10 525 
Radical Right 
Support (t-1) 
5.16 6.74 0.00 26.91 501 
Green Party Support 
(t-1) 
2.46 2.88 0.00 11.60 501 
Party Size 20.10 13.82 0.00 51.29 529 
Government Party 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 501 
Immigration (log) 3.87 1.17 0.99 6.85 380 
GDP per Capita 
(log) 
9.84 0.51 8.53 11.25 501 
Chernobyl 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 529 
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Figure A1 – Party Fixed Effects  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
95
%
 C
I f
or
 p
ar
ty
 fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
s
0 20 40 60 80
Party Unit - Multiculturalism (Position)
-5
0
5
10
95
%
 C
I f
or
 p
ar
ty
 fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
s
0 20 40 60 80
Party Unit - Multiculturalism (Salience)
-2
-1
0
1
2
95
%
 C
I f
or
 p
ar
ty
 fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
s
0 20 40 60 80
Party Unit - Environment (Position)
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
15
95
%
 C
I f
or
 p
ar
ty
 fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
s
0 20 40 60 80
Party Unit - Environment (Salience)
3 
 
Table A3 – ADLDV2 Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Multiculturalism 
Position 
Multiculturalism 
Salience 
Environment 
Position 
Environment 
Salience 
     
DV (t-1) -0.140 0.403* 0.013 0.129 
 (0.099) (0.173) (0.118) (0.114) 
     
DV (t-2) 0.047 -0.025 -0.161 -0.072 
 (0.074) (0.183) (0.096) (0.101) 
     
Radical Right / 
Green Support 
(t-1) 
0.040** 
(0.010) 
0.094** 
(0.032) 
-0.018 
(0.025) 
-0.182 
(0.223) 
Radical Right / 
Green Support 
(t-2) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
0.028 
(0.039) 
-0.027 
(0.021) 
-0.583* 
(0.228) 
     
Controls and 
Party Fixed 
Effects 
    
     
Observations 140 326 340 366 
R-squared 0.841 0.603 0.661 0.835 
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table A4 – Operationalization Immigration - Alonso and da Fonseca (2011) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃. ) = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼601 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼605 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼608 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼607 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼705
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼601 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼605 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼608 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼607 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼705 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆. ) = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼601 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼605 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼608 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼607 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼705 
 (1) (2) 
 
Immigration 
Position 
Immigration 
Salience 
   
Lagged DV -0.015 0.246* 
 (0.099) (0.112) 
Radical Right 
Support (t-1) 
0.015* 
(0.006) 
0.260** 
(0.062) 
Immigration (log) -0.017 0.907** 
 (0.026) (0.308) 
Party Size -0.013** 0.027 
 (0.004) (0.055) 
Government Party -0.069 -0.086 
 (0.049) (0.514) 
Party Fixed Effects   
   
   
Observations 333 365 
R-squared 0.619 0.840 
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table A5 – Operationalization Environment 
𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃. ) =  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼501 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼416 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼410
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼501 +  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼416 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼410 
𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆. ) = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼501 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼416 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼410 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Environmental 
Protection (per501) 
Environment 
Position  
Environment 
Salience 
    
Lagged DV 0.196 0.046 0.190 
 (0.112) (0.102) (0.107) 
    
Green Party 
Support (t-1) 
-0.408* 
(0.160) 
-0.028 
(0.016) 
-0.506** 
(0.159) 
    
GDP per Capita 
(log) 
0.807 
(0.643) 
0.270** 
(0.104) 
1.996** 
(0.727) 
    
Party Size 0.057* 0.002 0.053 
 (0.028) (0.005) (0.033) 
Government Party 0.738* 0.060 0.787* 
 (0.287) (0.041) (0.324) 
Chernobyl 1.288* -0.005 1.919** 
 (0.599) (0.084) (0.712) 
    
Fixed Effects    
    
Observations 432 409 432 
R-squared 0.778 0.694 0.853 
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table A6 – Reverse Causality Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Radical Right 
Support 
Radical Right 
Support 
Green Party 
Support 
Green Party 
Support 
     
Radical Right / 
Green Party 
Support (t-1) 
0.285 
(0.175) 
0.352* 
(0.158) 
0.368** 
(0.124) 
0.381** 
(0.124) 
     
Multiculturalism 
Position (t-1) 
0.140 
(0.509) 
   
     
Multiculturalism 
Salience (t-1) 
 0.298** 
(0.108) 
  
     
Environment 
Position (t-1) 
  -0.273 
(0.162) 
 
     
Environment 
Salience (t-1) 
   0.029 
(0.015) 
     
Controls and 
Party Fixed 
Effects 
    
     
     
Observations 182 307 355 369 
R-squared 0.884 0.889 0.933 0.933 
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table A7 - Interactions Radical Right Support 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Multiculturalism 
Position 
Multiculturalism 
Salience 
Multiculturalism 
Position 
Multiculturalism 
Salience 
     
Lagged DV 0.008 0.410** 0.039 0.404* 
 
 
(0.112) (0.159) (0.124) (0.160) 
Radical Right 
Support (t-1) 
0.032** 
(0.007) 
0.085** 
(0.032) 
0.027** 
(0.009) 
0.086* 
(0.034) 
     
Immigration 
(log) 
0.184** 
(0.024) 
0.307* 
(0.120) 
0.168** 
(0.030) 
0.283* 
(0.119) 
     
Party Size -0.011 0.027 -0.010 0.024 
 
 
(0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.019) 
Government 
Party 
-0.214** 
(0.070) 
-0.235 
(0.247) 
-0.226** 
(0.073) 
-0.288 
(0.250) 
     
Left-Right 
Position 
0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
  
     
Radical Right 
Support X Left-
Right 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
  
Vote Difference 
(t-1) 
  0.004 
(0.009) 
0.009 
(0.015) 
Radical Right 
Support X Vote 
Loss 
  -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
     
Party Fixed 
Effects 
    
     
Observations 202 365 199 357 
R-squared 0.748 0.597 0.735 0.593 
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table A8 - Interactions Green Party Support 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Environment 
Position 
Environment 
Salience 
Environment 
Position 
Environment 
Salience 
     
Lagged DV 0.035 0.169 0.045 0.190 
 
 
(0.100) (0.104) (0.103) (0.108) 
Green Party 
Support (t-1) 
-0.029* 
(0.015) 
-0.467** 
(0.153) 
-0.030 
(0.017) 
-0.470** 
(0.165) 
     
GDP per Capita 
(log) 
0.152 
(0.098) 
0.720 
(0.739) 
0.197 
(0.109) 
1.049 
(0.728) 
     
Party Size 0.003 0.061 0.006 0.061 
 
 
(0.006) (0.034) (0.006) (0.035) 
Government 
Party 
0.057 
(0.046) 
0.742* 
(0.315) 
0.089 
(0.049) 
0.609 
(0.320) 
     
Chernobyl -0.074 1.636* -0.054 1.948** 
 
 
(0.081) (0.685) (0.083) (0.703) 
Left-Right 
Position 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.047* 
(0.019) 
  
Green Support 
X Left-Right 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
  
Vote Difference 
(t-1) 
  -0.012* 
(0.005) 
0.054 
(0.041) 
Green Support 
X Vote 
Difference 
  0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
     
Party Fixed 
Effects 
    
     
Observations 406 429 397 420 
R-squared 0.641 0.839 0.623 0.832 
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table A9 – Interaction Different Operationalization Left-Right Position 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Multiculturalism 
Position 
Multiculturalism 
Salience 
Environment 
Position 
Environment 
Salience 
     
Lagged DV 0.004 0.410** 0.036 0.170 
 (0.107) (0.159) (0.100) (0.104) 
     
Radical Right / 
Green Party 
Support (t-1) 
0.032** 
(0.008) 
0.087** 
(0.033) 
-0.029 
(0.015) 
-0.486** 
(0.150) 
Party Size -0.012 0.026 0.003 0.058 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.006) (0.034) 
Government 
Party 
-0.214** 
(0.069) 
-0.255 
(0.246) 
0.056 
(0.047) 
0.725* 
(0.314) 
Immigration 
(log) 
0.188** 
(0.022) 
0.297* 
(0.117) 
  
GDP per Capita 
(log) 
  0.152 
(0.098) 
0.722 
(0.735) 
     
Chernobyl   -0.072 1.623* 
   (0.081) (0.684) 
     
Left-Right 
Position 
0.271 
(0.148) 
-0.038 
(0.459) 
-0.306** 
(0.094) 
-1.880** 
(0.615) 
     
Left-Right 
Position X 
Radical Right / 
Green Party 
Support (t-1) 
0.015* 
(0.007) 
0.036 
(0.027) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.121 
(0.087) 
     
Party Fixed 
Effects 
    
     
Observations 204 368 409 432 
R-squared 0.747 0.593 0.641 0.840 
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Figure A2 – Marginal Effects Plot Different Operationalization Left-Right Position 
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